When Putin first served as the President of the Russian Federation, he once said: "Give me 20 years, return you a strong Russia"; now 20 years have passed, and strong Russia has not appeared, but instead of being trapped in the quagmire of the Russian and Ukraine War.Another sentence is remembered: "If Russia is gone, what else do you want to do!" The rustic and ambitiousness of the previous sentence is sorrowful with the decisiveness of the following sentence, forming a sharp contrast.Afterwards, Kong Mingdi observed, the reason may be related to Putin's national strategy and advancement timing.
In general, the Russian national development strategy of Putin is a strategic structure based on military aggressive and political security. Strategic planning in economics, technology, society, and culture is vague and in a secondary position.This strategic architecture does not meet the needs of the times, and it is difficult to succeed. Even if there is a breakthrough, it often suffers from the pain.Over time, there are still some key strategic misjudgments.
Putin took over the mess left by the ex -Elin.After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has gone through political turmoil and economic collapse. What the state needs is the development and rejuvenation under the premise of stability, and participates in the tide of increasingly fierce international economic and scientific and technological competition.Russia has a good foundation in this regard, but does not use it well.
The important development measures after Putin took office include cracking down, reorganizing strategic resources, introducing foreign capital, and strengthening the status of energy power.It's just that between these measures, there are parts of mutual resistance, such as fighting the relationship between oligarchs and the introduction of foreign capital.Coupled with the unstable political relationship with the West, it has not made full use of the technological advantages of the Soviet Union, and encountered the impact of the US subprime mortgage crisis and the European debt crisis., Latal state.The national living standards have not improved significantly, the industrial structure is still seriously imbalance, and there are few economic and technological innovation.
At the same time, Putin's strategic measures in military and political security have been continuously promoted, and they have repeatedly tried it in the early days and have repeatedly won. Although this did not change Russia, when facing the West, military technology was relatively backward, relying on courage and number of people and the number of people.History is still indirectly encouraging the increasing strategic and willfulness of Russia's high -level strategies.
Putin consolidates its own power status, first based on the success of the rebellion of Chechen, and then combat domestic energy and financial oligarchs to eliminate economic threats.When the global financial crisis affected Russia in 2008, Putin encountered huge doubts. He successfully recovered the public opinion through flash war against Georgia and obtained the geographical strategic fruit of Abuhaz and South Ossets.
Putin has tasted the sweetness many times and misjudged
The "Spring of Arabia" in 2011 has emerged in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia is equally popular in Russia. Putin once again forcibly dismembered Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea to improve its support rate. In 2015,Entering Syria strongly, stabilizing the pro -Russian Assad regime, maintaining the only naval base of the Mediterranean base Taltus, and showing the power of Russia's new battalion combat groups.In 2020, when the situation was turbulent, Russia's intervention saved the dazzling Lukashenko regime, so that the Russian and White Alliance was substantially promoted. Today, White Ross has the resident of Russia's army and tactical nuclear weapons.
Putin, who has tasted sweets many times, may be more confident and obsessed with this strategic wrist. When there is no way to do it on the issue of economic and people's livelihood, rely on the advancement of military and political strategy, transfer the dissatisfaction of the people, and gain the support of the people.It's just that these cannot avoid high -risk strategic misjudgments, especially about Ukraine.
First of all, it was seriously underestimated the battle will of Ukraine with a population of 40 million. It was thought that Georgia and 10 million people who would be less than 4 million people easily succumbed to foreign powers as if they were less than 4 million.Secondly, the timing of attacking Ukraine is severely delayed. If this battle is inevitable, 2014 should actually be the best time. At that time, Ukraine had just experienced domestic political division. It is said that the regular army was less than 50,000.Gong.By 2022, the Wudong area had a strong line of defense. The West provided eight years of military training and guidance. The number of troops had reached about 200,000, becoming a strong opponent of the Russian army.
Once again, it has seriously overestimated the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, especially the power of battalions and battle groups, and the degree of grasp of enemy intelligence.Under this confidence, the Lightning tactics of the five -way troops in hand in handy were quickly encountered in setbacks, and then they had to enter the long -lasting battle mode of retreating, offensive and re -defense.This is a military trap that any country in the world is unwilling to see, unless it is an opponent who wants to take advantage of the profit.
The secondary misjudgment of Western countries' support for Ukraine. Whether it is values or geopolitical differences, it is very obvious that the West in Ukraine maintains the last line of defense against Russia.However, Putin seemed that the West, which was still impacted by the crown disease at the time, would not have such a strategic will, just like Hitler, who was appeased in the Suzethe area that year, rushed into the quagmire of the Ukraine War.
In the end, the timing of dealing with military groups such as Wagner was seriously improperly selected, and almost the military mutiny that pushed Putin regime to the greatest threat to Putin regime.For the soldiers who have just returned from the battlefield, no matter what identity, they will immediately compile and rectify them. It is a unreasonable measure that will damage the morale of the entire troops. The successful calmness does not seem to cover up the mistakes in decision -making.
Putin promoted his national strategy with the courage of "although the tens of millions of people went", and even forgotten the millions of people who followed him. What should be really reasonable in this era should be.In 20 years, it can be made up, but it cannot guarantee the subsequent thorns.I believe that Putin and many Russians now have similar feelings.
The author is a commentator in Yangzhou, China
