Because the assessment indicators are too single, but also because of the "one -vote veto" system currently adopted in personnel, in order to cater to the preferences of higher officials, officials have become a helpless choice for them to avoid risks. "The hidden rules of officials and numbers have begun to do the way.This has made the real information in the bureaucratic system that has been distorted and further distorted in circulation.
Many people are doubtful for data provided by Chinese local governments.This kind of questioning attitude not only exists in the minds of some media and the public, but even the statistics provided by the former Premier Li Keqiang of the State Council have skepticism.
In mid -March 2007, Clark T. Randt, then the US ambassador to China, went to Shenyang to meet with Li Keqiang, the then Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee.Three days later, the main content of the meeting was returned to the US State Department in the form of secret electricity.According to the information disclosed by Wikilytic decryption, Reid said in the electronic text that the "star official" entertained him admitted to him at the meeting that the domestic GDP data (GDP) data of Liaoning Province, which he was in charge, was unreliable.He told Reid that he had to find a way to squeeze the water in the statistics.
Chinese officials who have doubts about statistical data are obviously not only Li Keqiang.Related studies have shown that this phenomenon is common within the government.Studies from the graduate zodiac at the School of Political Economics of London, the University of Political Science and Economics in the United Kingdom, and the study of the University of Virginia, Brantly Womack, confirmed this.Based on a survey of MPA students in Guangzhou Sun Yat -sen University, the two found that within the government, less than 64%of cadres and 28%of the staff were willing to trust the national level.In other words, within the government, at least 36%of cadres and 72%of the staff are not trusting the statistical data at the national level.
This is indeed an intriguing phenomenon.In the studies mentioned earlier, Xiao Kezhou and Walker attributed to the distortion of the internal information circulation of the Chinese bureaucratic system. This analysis makes sense.In the 1960s, Professor John D Sterman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, made a famous test -beer sales and circulation test.This is a strategy game similar to a man.
In the experiment, Stamman divided MBA students with different ages, nationality, and industry backgrounds into four groups, and played the role of consumers, retailers, dealers, and manufacturers.Sterman clearly requires that any upstream and downstream companies cannot exchange any commercial information, only allowing downstream links to pass orders to upstream companies, that is, consumers can only give orders to retailers, and retailers can only give orders to give orders to give orders to give orders to give orders to give orders.Dealers, dealers will give orders to manufacturers.As a result, at the beginning of the game, whether it is downstream retailers, midstream dealers or upstream manufacturers, at first, they were seriously out of stock, but finally ended with severe accumulation.
More interesting is that in the past 50 years, this game has been played by students with different countries, different races, different cultures, and different experiences in the classrooms of various famous universities.Among these people, there are some students who have never experienced workplace, but there are also many elites from the production or distribution system.However, no matter who played this game, there will be the same crisis and similar results in the end.
This phenomenon has aroused the interest of Professor Jay Forrester and the phenomenon of mutating this demand in the information transmission process is called "Bullwhip Effect".In his opinion, the problem of information transmission in the information chain of the "bullling effect" exposed information chain.Due to the asymmetry between the information between the nodes in the information chain, and to the maximization of each node to pursue their own interests, the information is distorted when the information chain is transmitted inside the information chain.
Because of this, the length of the information chain becomes a decisive factor that affects information distortion: in order to maximize the pursuit of its own interests, the information will often be treated with their own interests.Filtering ground sieve will minimize the harm.The longer the information chain, the more levels in the information transmission process, the more opportunities for information to be handled by information.When the information is transmitted to the final link, the information at this time is already far from the original information.
At present, China is a typical sectarian management, position division, and subordinates to accept superior command, and there are many levels. The transmission of the entire information is like a beer game.The statistical data is so high.
In addition, under the current political performance assessment system, one place and even a unit. If officials want to wear their own black hats, if they want to get promoted, they must have hard achievements. For example, how much GDP has increased, investment promotion has increased,How much and so on.However, it is because of the evaluation indicators too single, and because of the "one -vote veto" system currently adopted in personnel, the grassroots are in their limited economic resources. In order to cater to the preferences of superiors, officialsRisks, false reports and exaggerations have become their helpless choices for their risks.The hidden rules of "officials and numbers and numbers" have begun to do it. This has made the information that has been distorted within the bureaucratic system and further distorted in circulation.In order to report the numbers that are reported, many officials often do not hesitate to fake fraud. They are small and small, and they make a lot of special articles on the numbers.
Recently, the last year's audit report announced by various parts of China revealed that multiple local governments increased their fiscal revenue with fake methods. Some localities increased their revenue or even more than 10 billion yuan, which undoubtedly confirmed this.According to statistics, reports from Guangdong, Hebei, Sichuan, Qinghai, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region have disclosed the financial fraud of some county and municipal governments.
Among them, three cities and three counties in Guangdong Province have increased fiscal revenue by 17.101 billion yuan (RMB, about S $ 3.1 billion, the same below) through the purchase of state -owned assets in state -owned enterprises.Disposal public welfare assets, pay more state -owned capital operation income or no revenue, and increase fiscal revenue of 2.495 billion yuan; some areas of Sichuan Province will pay targeted donations into the fiscal at the same level, and the fiscal revenue will be 4.15122 million yuan.The fundamental reason why local increasing fiscal revenue is that the fiscal revenue growth indicator is an important indicator of political performance assessment.
The author is a Chinese economist, financial columnist
