Author: Liu Peizhen
In addition to the US government increased its restrictions on Huawei in May 2020, trying to cut off Huawei's export control of the United States and directly restrict its purchase of semiconductor products designed by American software and technology;The 20 companies that the Chinese military proposed, control or connected, and companies with comparative advantages in other high -tech fields in China may be sanctioned by the United States; on June 30, Huawei and ZTE have been listed in the United StatesIn the list of threatening the Guoan, the Federal Communications Commission banned enterprises from using government funds to purchase equipment from the two mainland factories. Obviously, the United States' new rounds of control over the Chinese technology industry sounded the alarm.The control methods are also more diversified, not to mention that on July 1, the Hong Kong version of the National Security Law on the road, US -China relations have deteriorated, and it also confirms that the main theme of the United States and China will be decoupled in the future.
In fact, the United States' control over the semiconductor industry in China is gradually increasing. In May 2019, Huawei's banning order, Huawei can still use the United States related software and technology to design semiconductor products, but this also causes the US sanctions against Huawei in 2019It did not achieve the expected effect, but prompted Huawei's smart phones in 2019 to squeeze the Apple in the world's second largest, second only to Samsung, and Hisilicon ranked the tenth largest in the world in the first quarter of 2020.In this case, in mid -May 2020, the United States further increased its sanctions against Huawei to accurately crack down on the core links in the core links in the semiconductor industry chain EDA software, semiconductor equipment and related chip foundries, especially the prohibition before the supplement before.The listing list can bypass the vulnerability, and it means that Huawei's future life and killing power will depend entirely on the US Department of Commerce.
However, the United States still leaves a 120 -day buffer period. Obviously, it depends on how the subsequent Chinese side receives the move. After all, the U.S. side sacrifice the ultimate purpose of restrictions, not to defeat Huawei at one time.The supply of supplies and effective review cycles can be held in the hands of the United States for a long time in exchange for more political or economic benefits. In this case, because Chinese semiconductor equipment and materials are still subject to overseas, the opposite shore is bufferingThe mediation and counter -balance balance of the period is extremely important, and it must be prepared for long -term war.
It is worth noting that the continuous upgrading of the Chinese technology industry and even the semiconductor industry may lead to the decoupling of the United States and China technology, which will cause the global electronic industry chain to reconstruct it. In particularLow -level manufacturing will transfer to Southeast Asia, and high -level manufacturing will return to Europe and the United States, and China needs to be alert to the risk of vacuum industries.
Therefore, in addition to accelerating the support of the second phase of integrated circuit fund, China has recently regarded the electronics industry as a strategic development industry, sacrificing a number of support policies, driving the industry to develop in the direction of technology upgrades, creating a new generation of electronic information informationIn addition to the technology -based new industry structure, it also increases the investment and research and development investment as soon as possible, and increases the attention of basic education of scientific and technological basic education.Equipment is the top priority. After all, in order to cope with the risk of discounted in the United States and China in the future, China needs to vigorously strengthen the autonomous security and controlling of the supply chain.
(The author is a researcher at the Taiwan Institute of Economics)
