The expansion of sanctions on Chinese technology companies in the United States is not surprising. Chinese technology companies have achieved leadership in the fields of communications, artificial intelligence and data services.The United States regards technology as the main battlefield to compete with China, restricting Chinese corporate capabilities, cutting off their contact with US companies or preventing them from entering the US market.

The goal of the United States is to accelerate the return of its overseas manufacturing industry and slow down China's economic recovery and technological progress after the epidemic.US Minister of Justice William Middot; Balta said at a conference in Washington in February: Chinese current technology has imposed unprecedented challenges to the United States. He also reiterated the allegations of the technical transfer of Chinese companies forced American companies.

The United States' concerns brings policy actions.The United States has recently released a series of policies aimed at preventing China's 5G leadership.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued the requirements of U.S. operators who cannot buy or accept ZTE and Huawei services and equipment;It is likely to be refused to issue an export license.

Some Chinese universities and research institutions have also been included in the sanctions list on the grounds that they are suspected of endangering US security or national interests. They also put pressure on companies such as Samsung, Hynix, Murata, and TSMC to cut off their supply to China.In addition, the United States has accusations with military and civilians of Chinese technology, which may be a fact.However, data from MIT Technology Reviews show that China has invested more artificial intelligence technology for commercial rather than military, but the United States is the opposite.This may weaken the competitiveness of American business technology.

The above -mentioned sanctions or measures are getting the results expected by the Trump administration.Of course, there is also a clear domestic purpose: it consolidates Trump's image among voters, that is, strong man leaders and toughness to China.China has reached back. Last year, China spent $ 29 billion to establish a fund to promote domestic semiconductor production, and China vigorously developed the domestic market and enhanced the business environment.

At the same time, Huawei will also launch smartphones without American chips through cooperation with local manufacturers (such as Ziguang).With the outbreak of the epidemic, China and the United States have opened up another front to start a drooling war on the conspiracy theory of the origin of the epidemic.This has increased the anger of the public in the two countries, and it also increases the narrative theme around the decoupling.

But global investors do not need to be too pessimistic about the decoupling.First of all, competition between China and the United States and some decoupling will be the new normal of the interaction between the two countries.Although there are differences between China and the United States, it is impossible to be completely decoupled.Considering the urgent needs of global challenges, the reluctant cooperation between them will still be very close, such as global health, climate change, network security, data governance, terrorism, global trading system and economic recovery.

At the NATO Summit last December, US Secretary of Defense Esper mentioned that China was a strategic challenge to China as the United States, but it said that it does not mean that China is now an enemy.The United States will be regarded as a strong deterrent relationship with Chinese relations and competing for contact. Just as Trump launches a trade war on China, on the one hand, it tries to establish a connection with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Trump's straightforward nationalism is a powerful political weapon that is conducive to his election.U.S. history is full of cases of using external pressure or crisis to stimulate national terror and anxiety, so as to unite Congress, workers and industry leaders to cope with national threats, and no exception to the continuous upgrade of China.

In order to win votes, we will see more restraints against China, including not only stricter and wider control over the technology field, but also more interference in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang issues.The speed of decline between China and the United States is determined by the domestic political and economic goals of the White House.

Secondly, although the competition between China and the United States is increasing, it is too early to judge the negative impact on American manufacturing suppliers.Some surveys show that American companies are leaving China due to scientific and technological warfare, but some still stay, of course, they are still anxious about Chinese policies.Therefore, China is using the increasingly open industrial and technical policies to protect the willingness of intellectual property rights to create opportunities for overseas investors.

The Chinese market and American technology cooperation space is very large.For example, in 2019, Qualcomm's total revenue was US $ 24.2 billion, and the Chinese market accounted for 47.8%(about 11.6 billion US dollars).If it withdrawn from the Chinese market, profit will be greatly reduced, and it will affect R & D investment and weaken competitiveness.As Qualcomm competitors and collaborators, Huawei imported from the United States in 2019, from $ 11 billion in the previous year to $ 18.7 billion in 2019.It is meaningless to destroy this supply chain, or that the law of comparative advantage is not out of date.

Third, what really needs concerns between China and the United States and the world lies in how to improve domestic politics and social unfairness and respond to challenges from the world.

The next wave of economic prosperity bonus may have to wait until 2025 to 2030, the maturity of 6G, edge computing, L4 -level autonomous driving and digital transportation systems.But from now on, it will be a challenge to all economies.Countries should focus on how to find practical strategies and respond to challenges after the epidemic, such as strengthening global cooperation, investing in information and communication technology and innovation, or promoting free trade to accelerate the restoration of the economy and respond to other global challenges.

However, as the people lose confidence in globalization, the world is sliding towards a opposite direction, but has opened the way for protective and populism.From Hong Kong to Chile, protests from various places have not taken the streets due to poverty and oppression, but the middle class that have been educated well.These young digital technology users are affected by the corresponding fake news and fake messages on social media.

It is meaningless to argue the superiority of the Western or Eastern countries. Western democracy does not necessarily bring fairness. The oriental centralized system is not always strict. Both systems are absorbing the advantages of the other party and promoting innovation and stability.It can be seen that China has better controlled the domestic epidemic, and even extended a helping hand to the world.

Most decision makers have not lost their wisdom.Under the global economic decline, multilateral cooperation is emphasized.China will definitely adhere to its own path without being distracted by trade, technology or financial competition.If after this epidemic, countries act in ideology, such as advocating the establishment of a trade version of NATO instead of the spirit of cooperation to manage the economy and dependence science. Whether it is the Cold War or the hot war, it will not stop.

(The author is a member of the academic committee of the Chinese and Foreign Humanities Exchange Research Base of Peking University in China, and an associate professor of part -time job of the Global Health Research Institute of Xi'an Jiaotong University)

The English version of this article was originally contained in Asia Global, the Electronic Journal of the University of Hong Kong,