According to Lianhe Zaobao reported on April 28, the famous American investor Raymond Thomas Dalio recently warned that China and the United States have continued to test each other's red line, and they have "on the edge of war", and the situation will follow the United States with the United StatesEntering the presidential election season continued to deteriorate.He wrote: Both countries are very close to each other's red line, and they are also adopting a brinksmanship to test the other party's red line; political needs will also lead to more aggressive marginal policies in the next 18 months.

The competition between China and the United States is becoming increasing.According to US media statistics, the nine of the Nine of the 10 major policies in the United States and Republican parties have a violent party contest, and only a high degree of policies in China.Faced with the former President Obama's "Asia -Pacific Balance", the United States has been pressing on the issue of trade war, science and technology war, South China Sea, and Xinjiang, especially Taiwan.Actively strive for the extreme situation of "stormy waves" such as allies and time, internal circulation policies in China, and "retreating forests".The big game is back.

From the history of the 19th and 20th centuries, there are British and German games, British and Russian games, and the Cold War of the United States and the Soviet Union.Especially in the Cold War game under nuclear weapons conditions, the academic circles have developed the research of game theory methods.This is a prescribed decision -making method based on rational assumptions, which stipulates how rational actors should decide.The deterrent theory has risen in the context of the US -Soviet polar confrontation. It is believed that deterrence is a country in order to prevent the attack and hopes to convince potential attackers: 1. It has effective military strength; 2. It may bring an unbearable price to the attacker.; Third, if they are attacked, they will be threatened.

The classic deterrence theory based on nuclear deterrence theory has two basic assumptions: first, the behavior is rational; second, the conflict is the worst ending.In terms of deterrent credibility, classic deterrent theorists believe that threats are unbelievable.They believe that war or conflicts are the worst ending to both parties of the game. This choice does not meet the requirements of the "rational choice". Therefore, "maintaining the status quo" has become an inevitable choice for both sides of the game.

Unfortunately, this may not be a fact.The behavior may not necessarily be rational, and the conflict may not be the worst ending.

Patrick Morgan, a classic deterrent theorist, believes that the country may not be able to achieve rationality because in crisis, decision makers lack time to analyze all alternative plans, lack information about opponents and decision -making consequences, and be emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotional or emotionAffected by factors such as cognitive limitations.There is a saying that in the face of the Sino -US conflict or war, the military holding the most calm attitude is the military because they are based on the military power structure and balance between the two sides, and the results of the war in the Taiwan Strait or the Western Pacific may not hold the results without holding.Optimistic; politicians of Congress or administrative agencies are full of good fighting and passion, which reflects a possibility and danger.

In addition, whether the conflict is controllable, the most terrible result of the limited or out of control of the nuclear war, the US strategic policies are usually not clear and clear;Failure is frequent.Historically, this is the case for the Vietnam War or the Afghanistan war this century.

Zagel and Kilgo have proposed the theory of perfect deterrence to make up for the logic of the classic deterrence theoretical logic.

Perfect deterrence theory has abandoned the assumption of "conflict is the worst ending". It is believed that conflict is not necessarily the worst ending, and deterrence is credible.The credibility of deterrence is determined by a country's preference between conflicts and concessions.When both parties have a credible and capable deterrent power, maintaining the "status quo" will become a rational choice between the two sides.On the other hand, if the deterrent is unbelievable or the two sides have no trust, or the deterrence is not equal, it is not necessary to maintain the status quo when one party is considered to be credible.

The United States can no longer have trust in China, which is not a political factor.The world is composed of interests and promoted by interests, and US capital cannot control the world's most powerful capital -China National Capital, like other usual scenarios.For China, every Chinese will ask: Will the United States admit that Taiwan is an indiscriminate part of China according to the results of World War II?Will the United States recognize that under the WTO (WTO) system, will the United States grow to the world's largest economy and technology -industry -leading countries that have surpassed the United States?The answers are negative.This is the essential issue of the unity and development right of national sovereignty.

In addition to the lack of trust, deterrence needs to be equivalent.China is actively expanding the Navy, Hyperminal Missile and Hidden Fighter, but the United States believes that there may be the opportunity to overwhelm and defeat China in the Western Pacific.This is the reason why the US National Security Report was mentioned last year that the next 10 years will be the decisive decisive decisive competition in China and the United States. Because of the time, this advantage and possibility will be lost.

In these two cases, it is impossible to maintain the status quo, and the "guardrail" of Sino -US relations will not really exist.Taking the game of the Taiwan Strait or the three -party game of the Taiwan Strait or the Sino -U.S., The United States and Japan as an example, Zagel and Kilgo established a three -party crisis game and extending deterrent models to highlight the strategic choice of the protector.The game focuses on the defender and after the challenge is encountered, if the defender does not provide support, the protector may re -associate with a more reliable behavior.This highlights the importance of "deterrence and restraint" in extending deterrence -defensors have certain competitive benefits, that is, they must support the defender to deter the challengers without indulgence without indulgence.However, the United States does not always ensure the development of the situation and the balanced military balance. The Sino -US slip towards the edge of the war is a high probability event within 10 years.

(The author is a special researcher at the area of Sichuan Normal University and the State Research Institute)