(Tel Aviv News) The documents and emails obtained by the New York Times and interviews showed that Israeli officials have long been in More than a year before the Hamas attack on October 7, I learned about Hamas's combat plan.However, the Israeli military and intelligence officials believed that the plan was too bold at the time, and Hamas had to execute was too difficult, so it did not pay attention.
New Year said that one of the files up to 40 pages and the Jericho Wall of Jericho Wall states a plan to break the Casa defense, capture Israeli cities and attack important military bases.During the attack on October 7, Hamas accurately followed this blueprint, such as launching rockets at the beginning of the attack, using drones to destroy camera monitoring and machine guns along the border, and using gliding umbrellas into Israel to enter Israelwait.
The file also includes the location and scale of the military, information centers, and other sensitive information, causing people to collect intelligence in Hamas and Israel Security Agency Whether there is a confidential leakage internally.
In fact, in July of this year, three months before Hamas attacks occurred, an analyst of the Israeli intelligence unit issued a warning that Hamas launched a densely dense exercise for a day.Similarly, the Israeli Army is still improper.
A Colonel Israeli said that this exercise is just a scene of Hamas's "completely imagined", which does not mean that Hamas is capable of achieving it.
But this analyst bluntly said when an email responded: "I do not agree that this is the imagination."
She pointed out that Hamas's exercise followed the content of the Jeriko Wall and warned Hamas's ability to establish this plan."This is a plan designed to launch a war ... Not just to attack a village."
She further emphasized with the lessons of the 1973 war, "If we are not careful, history may be repeated." In the 1973 Atonement Japanese War, Israel was raid by Egypt and Syria, causing more than 2,600 Israeli army.
Some Israeli officials admitted privately that if the military looked at the warnings seriously at the time and transferred a large number of reinforcements to the southern region of Hamas attacks, the military may even prevent attacks.
There is a fatal error behind these failures, that is, he is convinced that Hamas is unable to launch an attack and dare not launch an attack.Officials said that this confidence is deeply rooted in the Israeli government, so that they ignore more and more opposite evidence.
But officials also said that the boldness of Hamas's blueprint is easy to underestimate it.Because all the army will formulate a plan that never use it, and Israeli officials estimate that even if Hamas launch an invasion operation, it may only gather dozens of people to start actions, rather than the ultimate hundreds of people involved.
In addition, the Israeli government has also mistakenly interpreted Hamas' actions.Hamas had negotiated the Palestinian work in Israel, making Israel think it showed that Hamas had no intention of motioning the war.
